Immutable backups explained: will yours survive ransomware?
Ransomware gangs delete backups before they strike. What immutable backups are, what they do not protect against, and the questions to ask your provider.
"We have backups" is the first thing most business owners say when ransomware comes up. The harder question is whether those backups would still exist after an attacker had spent a few days inside your network. Modern ransomware crews look for backups on purpose and delete or encrypt them before they set off the main attack. Immutable backups are the answer the backup industry has settled on. This guide explains what the term means, what it does and does not protect against, and how to check whether you really have it.

What attackers do to ordinary backups
An attacker who gets administrator access to your network can usually reach whatever your IT staff can reach. That typically includes:
- A backup drive or NAS mapped on the server, which gets encrypted along with everything else.
- The backup software's console, where they can delete backup jobs, shorten retention or wipe old copies.
- Cloud backup accounts, if the password is saved on the server or reused, where they can delete the stored copies.
- Virtual machine snapshots, which are not backups at all and disappear with the host.
In other words, a backup that an administrator can delete is a backup an attacker can delete.
What "immutable" means
An immutable backup is a copy that cannot be changed or deleted by anyone, including an administrator, until a retention period you set in advance has passed. If you set 30 days, each restore point is locked for 30 days, and no password, no admin account and no support request can remove it early. Common ways this is done:
- Object lock on cloud storage. Many cloud storage services offer a compliance or locked mode that the backup software uses to write copies that cannot be removed until the lock expires.
- Hardened backup appliances or repositories. A dedicated backup server or appliance that refuses delete requests for locked restore points, and is not joined to your Windows domain.
- Provider-side protection. Some backup services keep deleted backups for a set number of days in a separate area that the customer cannot empty.
Immutable, offline and versioned are not the same thing
- Offline (air-gapped) backups, such as a rotated drive kept off site, cannot be reached over the network at all. They are a good complement, but only as current as the last swap, and only if someone actually swaps them.
- Versioning, like OneDrive's version history or a NAS recycle bin, keeps older copies of files but can usually be switched off or emptied by an administrator.
- Immutable backups stay online and current, but are locked against deletion.
A sensible small business setup usually combines a fast local backup for everyday restores with at least one immutable copy elsewhere. If you want to know how long each copy should be kept, see our guide on how long to keep backups.
What immutability does not protect against
- Data that was never backed up. If a laptop, a Microsoft 365 mailbox or a new server is not in the backup job, locking the job does not help.
- Backups that already contain the problem. If an attacker has been inside for weeks, your recent restore points may include their tools. Longer lock periods and the ability to restore to an isolated environment matter.
- Losing the key. If backups are encrypted and the key is stored only on the server that was attacked, an immutable copy you cannot decrypt is useless. Our article on backup encryption keys covers this.
- The account that controls the lock. If the lock is in "governance" mode or can be changed in the account settings, someone who steals that account may be able to remove it. Ask which mode is used.
Questions to ask your IT or backup provider
- Which of our backup copies are immutable, and for how many days is each restore point locked?
- Can any of our administrator accounts, or yours, delete or shorten that lock? If so, how is that account protected?
- Is the backup server or appliance joined to our Windows domain, and does it use the same passwords as the rest of the network?
- Does the backup cover everything that matters, including Microsoft 365, staff laptops and any cloud servers?
- When did we last restore from the immutable copy, and how long did it take?
- Would we get an alert if backup jobs were deleted, retention was changed or a backup started failing?
The last two questions matter most. An untested backup is a hope, not a plan, so schedule a restore drill and include the immutable copy in it.
How we can help
Our managed backup service can review what you have today, add an immutable copy where it is missing and test that it restores. Call (213) 986-4855.